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Introduction: Essays from the Bench
JUDGE EUGENE A. WRIGHT*
The roots of the judicial system run deep - as far back as our nation's
beginning. From the first it has been multifaceted: philosophical, practical,
theoretical. Always, however, ithas been instrumental in building our nation
and shaping our institutions.
The contents of this Colloquium touch a variety of topics concerning the
judicial system. In the philosophical vein, the impact of the judiciary on
present day institutions is explored.1 On a practical level, information on the
preparation for, and trial of, civil cases is provided to guide the new lawyer
and to remind the old.2 Lastly, past theory, having become reality through the
culmination of years of study, is presented in an examination of legislation
aimed at implementing the important right of access to our courts.3
Today the role of the judiciary is expanding as never before. Judges are
becoming more active in both the structuring of their own court responsi-
bilities4 and in the area of constitutional adjudication.
It has been said that the substantive constitutional issues of each period
reflect its central political questions.5 Thus, the problems faced by the
country in any era are eventually carried to its courts, as judges are well aware.
Adjudication is becoming a more complex process. Standing to sue has been
expanded. 6 The use of class actions is increasing and with it the number of
members whose rights must be adjudicated and, concomitantly, the scope of
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
'Bazelon, The Impact of the Courts on Public Administration, 52 IND. L. J. - (1976),
infra [hereinafter cited as Bazelon].2Richey, A Federal Trial Judge's Reflections on the Preparation for and Trial of Civil
Cases, 52 IND. L. J. - (1976), infra. For a more theoretical view of the advocate's role see
Lambros, American Advocacy - Foundation of the American Dreary, 52 IND. L. J. -. (1976),
infra [hereinafter cited as Lambros].
3Bonsal, The Criminal Justice Act - 1964 to 1976, 52 IND. L. J. - (1976), infra.
4In the past dozen years judicial activism in the trial courts has produced new techniques
in jury selection and the growth of pretrial conferences and orders, both of which expedite jury
and nonjury trials. The extensive use of pattern jury instructions has also proved beneficial to
both judges and counsel.
At the appellate level, judges are exploring the merits of oral decisions from the bench,
the use of short unpublished opinions which have no precedential value, and the imposition of
time limitations on oral argument and prehearing conference. Such conferences have been used
to require counsel to consider the simplification of issues and various settlement possibilities
before they invest further time and resources in pursuing an appeal to a court with a heavy
backlog of pending matters.
-Cox, The New Dimensions of Constitutional Adjudication, 51 WASH. L. REv. 791 (1976).
6Compare Tennessee Power Co. v. TVA, 306 U.S. 118 (1939), with United States v.
SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669 (1973). But see Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Organization, 96 S.
Ct. 1917 (1976).
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the remedy imposed.7 Interpretation by court decision is the key to the
meaning of those rights.
The results of such interpretation are becoming more comprehensive,
however. Rather than merely blocking legislative initiatives, changes in the
established legal order are now being mandated. More and more courts are
imposing affirmative duties, ordering reforms which necessitate on-going
action. These include desegregation decrees,8 reorganization of state
institutions9 and, occasionally, decisions setting forth comprehensive
guidelines.'0
This may be partially the result of what Judge Bazelon identifies as the
due process revolution" which has fueled the expansion of court activities.
But courts cannot always make their prescribed remedies happen, nor can they
always claim scientific or technical expertise in a complicated case. What
function then can the court serve? As Judge Bazelon indicates, even in such
cases judges can monitor the decision making process for thoroughness,
completeness and rationality.
Counsel can help in this process by being prepared, well versed in the law
and facts and cognizant of their continuing duty to improve our system of
justice.' 2 Judge Richey's article and its appendices should be helpful to
7One recent example is Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976), a class action on behalf of all
citizens of Philadelphia to force complete revision of police practices in the city and
establishment of procedures for handling citizens' complaints of police misconduct. The
district court directed defendants to draft a "comprehensive program for dealing adequately
with civilian complaints" and formulated guidelines to help the process. 357 F. Supp. 1289,
1321 (1973).
Although the Supreme Court subsequently reversed the judgment, the decision can be
confined to its facts, which include a number of violations too small and too scattered to
support a finding of higher officials' indifference to citizen problems. Under this reading, Rizzo
indicates the potential for continuing judicial supervision of an executive department. Even
under another reading, the case exemplified the willingness of the district court and court of
appeals to become involved in adjudicating the rights of all members of the class.
8Such decrees, beginning with Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), have
continued with the orders relating to Boston public schools following the decision in Morgan v.
Hennigan, 379 F. Supp. 410 (D. Mass. 1974).
9United States District Judge Frank Johnson, for example, heard a class action suit aimed
at compelling a reorganization and improvement of services at Bryce Hospital, a mental health
facility in Alabama. Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971), hearing on standards
ordered, 334 F. Supp. 1341 (M.D. Ala. 1971), enforced, 344 F. Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala. 1972), aff'd
sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974).
He entered a long, detailed order for the operation of the physical facilities and the conduct
of the medical program, including the temperature of the hot water system and the numbers of
medical and supporting personnel for each job classification. 344 F. Supp. at 374, 382.
Similarly, federal courts have required the rewriting of prison rules and the reconstruction
of local prison facilities. See Gates v. Collier, 390 F. Supp. 482 (N.D. Miss. 1975), aff'd, 525 F.2d
965 (5th Cir. 1976); Inmates of the Suffolk County Jail v. Eisenstadt, 360 F. Supp. 676 (D. Mass.
1973).
10 One of the best known examples is perhaps Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
"Bazelon, supra note 1, at 103.
12Lambros, supra note 2, at 130-32. The American Bar Association Commission on
Standards of Judicial Administration has completed a tentative draft of Standards Relating to
Appellate Courts which deals also with questions concerning assistance of counsel. See Hazard,
Standards of Judicial Administration: Appellate Courts, 62 A.B.A.J. 1015, 1017 (1976).
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counsel in this respect, providing a guide to adequate trial preparation and
reminding them of the essentials of proper courtroom decorum. State and
federal trial judges will also find some valuable and very practical tips on trial
techniques.
Although we live in changing times, some things remain unchanged. One
of them is the "duty of the court, unimplemented by much doctrinal or other
verbal machinery, but there, live, throbbing like a heart: the felt duty to justice
which twins with the duty to law."' 13 This Colloquium, the Journal's second
effort to feature the federal judiciary, 14 was intended to provide the
opportunity for informal discussion from the members of the federal bench of
some of the important problems and developments of the judiciary. This
collection of essays will flesh out the concept of the "felt duty to justice" by
exploring the judiciary's past, its present, and its future. That courts change
at all is evidence of the always essential flexibility which accompanies any
enduring institution; that they can change in a progressive manner is the
essence of their success and a guarantee for continued freedom.
13K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 121 (1960).
14See Symposium, Problems of the Federal Judiciary: A View from the Bench, 51 IND. L. J.
293 (1976).
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